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Abstract
This paper focuses on the reform of accounting 
standards in China in 2007 and investigates its impact 
on equilibrium pricing in the audit market. We find 
that the concentration of the audit market and the 
probability of issuing modified audit opinions do not 
significantly change, but that audit fees increase signif-
icantly after the adoption of the new accounting stan-
dards in China. Deeper analysis suggests that (1) the 
implementation of the new IFRS-based Chinese Ac-
counting Standards (CASs) has increased the market 
risk faced by listed firms and thus auditors’ expected 
audit risk, causing an increase in audit fees, and (2) the 
degree of the increase in audit fees is positively related 
to the adjusted difference between net income accord-
ing to the old CAS before 2007 and the new CAS after 
2007. We thus conclude that the reform has had a sig-
nificant impact on audit pricing in China.
Keywords:Reform of accounting standards-Au-
dit market-Industry structure-Audit pricing
Introduction
This study investigates the impact of the adoption 
of the new accounting standards in China in 2007 on 
audit pricing. Adopting or widely drawing on Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) has be-
come the trend in accounting standards in the current 
global capital market (Daske et al., 2008; Barth et al., 
2008, Barth and Taylor, 2009; IFRS). However, there 
is some controversy about whether or not the adoption 
of new accounting standards based on the measure-
ment attribute of fair value improves accounting in-
formation quality or the resource allocation efficiency 
of the capital market (Dechow et al., 2009; Barth and 
Taylor, 2009; Xianjie, 2009; Kai et al., 2009). As a re-
sult, it is necessary to comprehensively test the impact 
of the change in accounting standards on the use of ac-
counting information.
Accounting standards are an important basis that 
auditors use to issue audit opinions, so any change in 
accounting standards will affect the working base of au-
ditors directly and thus the structure of the entire audit 
industry. We investigate how a change in accounting 
standards affects audit pricing from three dimensions: 
the concentration of the audit market, the attributes of 
the audit product and audit risk. Summary statistics show 
that audit fees clearly increased following the adoption 
of the new accounting standards. However, the concen-
tration of the audit market has not changed. Product 
heterogeneity, measured as the proportion of modified 
audit opinions (MAOs), decreased. We thus conclude 
that the impact of the adoption of the new accounting 
standards on audit pricing has mainly occurred due to 
a change in expected audit risk. We also discuss how the 
adoption of the new accounting standards in China has 
affected audit market pricing strategy according to eco-
nomic theory. Based on previous relevant research, we 
argue that the adoption of fair value measurement in the 
new accounting standards makes firms disclose more 
information about their market risk, which increases the 
expected audit risk of auditors and also audit fees. The 
original sample that we select includes all listed firms in 
the A share market in China between 2004 and 2008. We 
use the same method as Kai et al. (2009) and employ the 
difference between net income under the old account-
ing standards and net income under the new accounting 
standards to measure the degree of the impact on earn-
ings information.
The results suggest that the larger the difference 
in net income between the old and new accounting 
standards, the larger the change in audit fees. That is 
to say, the adoption of the new CAS has had a signifi-
cant impact on equilibrium pricing in the audit mar-
ket and has increased audit fees. The remainder of 
this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes 
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characteristics of the industry structure of the audit 
market before and after the reform of the account-
ing standards in 2007. Section 3 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 4 dis-
cusses the research design. Section 5 presents the em-
pirical results and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Audit market structure: Summary analysis
The independent audit opinions offered by audi-
tors are based on the legitimacy, rationality and con-
sistency of the accounting information disclosed by 
firms. Accounting standards are the main benchmark 
used toassess the quality of accounting information. 
Changes in accounting standards not only lead to 
changes in the recording, measuring and reporting of 
financial statements, but also directly influence audi-
tors’ workand the competitive behavior of auditors. 
This can lead to certain problems. For example, the 
adoption of IFRS may create more space for audi-
tors to express a reasonable professional judgment, 
but this may confer a competitive advantage on high-
quality auditors. Further, changes in standards may 
influence the differences between the audit products 
provided by auditors, which may cause the type and 
structure of audit opinions to change. The reform 
of Chinese accounting standards, in particular, may 
have affected the expected audit risk of auditors and 
in turn increase the audit fees paid by firms.
If the adoption of new accounting standards has 
affected the equilibrium in audit pricing, it is necessary 
to evaluate the characteristics both of the supply side 
and demand side of audit services. This study assumes 
the main characteristics of the supply side to be audit 
market concentration and audit product differentia-
tion, and the main characteristic of the demand side 
to be audit risk. If audit prices increase due to the in-
creased concentration of the audit market and differ-
entiation of audit products, then we can conclude that 
it may lead to market monopoly or market segmenta-
tion. Thus, the adoption of new accounting standards 
may decrease the resource allocation efficiency of the 
audit market. Conversely, if an increase in audit risk 
leads to an increase in the marginal cost of audit ser-
vices, that is, if audit fees increase as compensation 
for the additional risk assumed by auditors, then the 
equilibrium price of audit services will remain effec-
tive, which suggests that the adoption of new account-
ing standards does not change the resource allocation 
efficiency of the audit market.
At the beginning of 2006, the Ministry of Fi-
nance issued the new Chinese Accounting Standards 
(CASs), comprising one basic standard and 38 specific 
standards, which listed firms were required to fully fol-
low from 2007. The introduction of the CAS offers an 
important institutional setting to investigate how the 
adoption of new standards affects equilibrium pricing 
in the audit market. We first look at whether the reform 
of accounting standards has affected audit fees.
Audit fees 
We summarize the audit fees paid by listed firms be-
tween 2002 and 2009 (see Chart 1). Before the account-
ing standards reform (2002–2006), the average fee paid 
by listed firms for audit services was 6,00,000Yuan, 
whereas the average fee in 2007 was 8,40,000 Yuan. 
Chart 1 clearly shows that audit fees increased sharply in 
2007, but in 2008 and 2009 were more or less the same 
as in 2007. The price change corresponds to the time 
when listed firms were required to follow the new ac-
counting rules. We thus conclude that the reform of the 
CAS has affected pricing in the audit market.
The price of audit products is determined by 
both the supply side and demand side. We argue that 
the main characteristics of the supply side are audit 
market concentration and audit product differentia-
tion, and that audit risk is the main characteristic of 
the demand side of audit services. If the change in 
the CAS has affected audit fees, it must also be the 
case that the change in the CAS has led to a change 
in the concentration of the audit market, audit prod-
uct differentiation or audit risk, or a combination of 
these, which in turn relates to a change in the final 
pricing of audits, as shown in the following diagram.
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Audit market concentration
The new CAS implemented from 2007 onward 
are very different to the old CAS. First, many of the 
new accounting methods give firms more discretion-
ary power. For example, according to the new rules, 
the consolidation difference in an acquisition at a pre-
mium is defined as goodwill. Intangible assets such as 
goodwill and trademarks need not be amortized and 
need only be evaluated annually. The impairment, 
if any, must be extracted. Further, one of the most 
important characteristics of the new CAS is the use 
of fair value as a new measurement attribute, which 
gives firms more room to change their accounting 
policy. Although the rules on asset write-downs re-
duce the opportunity for income management, the 
rules on the measurement of fair value, debt restruc-
turing, non-currency asset exchange, R&D expenses 
relative to intangible assets and the capitalization of 
borrowing costs increase the opportunity for income 
management among listed firms. When firms comply 
with the new CAS to account for transactions, audi-
tors must use more of their professional judgment in 
the audit process. As a consequence, high-quality 
audit firms may possess a greater competitive advan-
tage, which will improve their market share and alter 
the concentration of the audit market.
Figure 1. Average audit price by year
The new CAS implemented from 2007 onward is 
very different to the old CAS. First, many of the new ac-
counting methods give firms more discretionary power. 
For example, according to the new rules, the consolida-
tion difference in an acquisition at a premium is defined 
as goodwill. Intangible assets such as goodwill and trade-
marks need not be amortized and need only be evaluat-
ed annually. The impairment, if any, must be extracted. 
Further, one of the most important characteristics of the 
new CAS is the use of fair value as a new measurement 
attribute, which gives firms more room to change their 
accounting policy. Although the rules on asset write-
downs reduce the opportunity for income manage-
ment, the rules on the measurement of fair value, debt 
restructuring, non-currency asset exchange, R&D ex-
penses relative to intangible assets and the capitalization 
of borrowing costs increase the opportunity for income 
management among listed firms. When firms comply 
with the new CAS to account for transactions, auditors 
must use more of their professional judgment in the au-
dit process. As a consequence, high-quality audit firms 
may possess a greater competitive advantage, which will 
improve their market share and alter the concentration 
of the audit market.
We use the ratio of revenue of the four (ten) larg-
est audit firms (“Big Four” and “Big Ten”) to the 
100 largest audit firms as the proxy for audit market 
concentration (see Figure 2). Past studies usually 
consider the Big Four to be a measure of high-quality 
audit firms, which is the reason why we use the ratio 
of the revenue of Big Four (Ten) to the 100 largest 
audit firms to measure audit market concentration.
The largest 100 audit firms are ranked based 
on the revenue of audit firms in a fiscal year. This 
information comes from the “Information on the 
National Top 100 Accounting Firms” announced 
by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (CICPA). Between 2002 and 2009, the 
four largest firms were Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
KPMG, Deloitte and Ernst and Young. The re-
maining six firms in the Big Ten changed every year.
Chart 2 suggests that the concentration of the 
Big Four increased year by year in the sample peri-
od. Their market share was 36.98% in 2002, reached 
54.72% in 2007 and then began to decrease. The ra-
tio in 2009 was 44.3%. Using the information on the 
Big Ten to measure market concentration produces 
a similar result. We thus conclude that the adoption 
of the new CAS has not affected the concentration 
of the audit market significantly.
In accordance with the stipulation of the Ministry 
of Finance, listed firms began to follow the new CAS 
from 2007. The revenue of audit firms announced by 
CICPA include audit fees from non-listed firms, which 
may not match our sample firms, so we use another 
proxy for audit market concentration to reflect the in-
fluence of the adoption of the new accounting standards 
on the structure of the audit market: the total number of 
listed firms audited by the Big Four (Big Ten)
In Chart 3, we calculate the ratio of the number 
of listed firms audited by the Big Four to the num-
ber of all listed firms. We find that the ratio does not 
change significantly after the adoption of the new 
CAS, but that the ratio calculated with the number 
of listed firms audited by the Big Ten rises slightly. 
These results indicate that the change in the CAS 
has not led to a change in the concentration of the 
audit market.
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Product characteristics: audit opinion
An audit opinion is the judgment about a firm by 
auditors using accounting standards as the criterion. 
It provides assurance of the information contained 
in financial statements. We explore whether the 
change in the CAS has affected the type and content 
of audit opinions issued by audit firms, or more spe-
cifically whether the characteristics of the product 
provided by audit firms has changed with the adop-
tion of the new accounting standards. Compared 
with the pre-2007 CAS, the new CAS place more 
emphasis on the professional judgment of audi-
tors. This may have caused a change in audit quality 
requirements. If the required audit quality has in-
creased, then auditors who possess greater profes-
sional knowledge are more likely to issue modified 
audit opinions (MAOs) when they audit the finan-
cial statements of listed firms.
Figure 2. Ratio of the revenue of Big Four (Big Ten) to the revenue of the 100 largestaudit firms
The number of MAOs should thus increase fol-
lowing the adoption of the new CAS. We examine the 
classified statistics on the audit opinions of listed firms 
between 2002 and 2009 (see Table 1) and find that 
the number of MAOs and the ratio of the number of 
MAOs to the total number of audit opinions slightly 
decreased over the period, which is contrary to our 
conjecture. However, the decrease in the proportion of 
MAOs may in fact indicate that information disclosure 
quality has improved. In all, there is no conclusive evi-
Figure 3. Ratio of the number of listed firms audited by the Big Four (Big Ten) to the total number of listed firms
dence to indicate that the implementation of the new 
CAS has had a significant impact on the structure of 
the audit opinions of listed firms from the perspective 
of the industry structure of the audit market.
One of the most important characteristics of the 
new accounting standards is the adoption of fair value 
as a measurement base, in compliance with the IFRS. 
This raises the question of whether, in issuing their opin-
ions, auditors pay more attention to the fair value fac-
tor since the change. To answer this question, we need 
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to investigate the specific reason why some listed firms 
were given MAOs after the adoption of the new CAS.
We examine all of the audit opinion reports and find 
that the reasons why auditors issued MAOs are main-
ly related to traditional problems such as uncertainty 
about accounts receivable, the possession of the funds 
of listed firms by controlling shareholders and related 
parties, obscure long-term equity investments caused by 
the losses of subsidiaries or affiliated companies, and so 
on, and that no firm was given an MAO because there 
was some flaw in the quality of information disclosed 
due to fair value. In all, we conclude that the change in 
the CAS has not had a significant impact on the content 
and quality of the products provided by auditors.
The results from these summary statistics show that 
the change in the CAS has not affected the concentra-
tion of the audit market or the differentiation of audit 
products. However, we do find that audit fees increased 
significantly after 2007. We thus argue that the change in 
CAS has caused expected audit risk to increase, which 
has in turn caused an increase in audit fees.
Whatever the audit market structure, the mar-
ginal return of audit services is always equal to the 
marginal cost in equilibrium, which is the condition 
that determines the audit price. As the audit mar-
ket is not always competitive, the equilibrium price 
may be higher than the marginal cost. If the increase 
in audit fees is caused by supply side factors (audit 
market concentration and audit product differentia-
tion), that is, if the increase in audit fees is caused by 
an increase in the degree of monopoly, then the dif-
ference between the audit price and its marginal cost 
will increase, which indicates that the resource al-
location efficiency of the audit market will decrease. 
Conversely, if the increase in audit fees is caused by 
demand side factors, that is, if audit fees are reason-
able compensation for the elevated audit risk, then 
the increase is due to the increase in the marginal 
cost of the audit. In this case, the difference between 
the audit price and its marginal cost has not wid-
ened, which means that the resource allocation ef-
ficiency of the audit market has not deteriorated.
We now examine how the adoption of the IFRS-
based accounting standards has affected the expect-
ed audit risk and the determination of price when 
the audit market is in equilibrium.
Table 1. Proportion of each type of audit opinion, Audit opinion
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Clean opinion with emphasis of matter 8.31% 4.64% 5.00% 5.67% 5.56% 5.85 4.74% 4.85%
Modified opinion 3.50% 2.09% 3.77% 4.36% 2.67% 1.02 1.11% 0.73%
Disclaimer of opinion 1.63% 1.63% 2.17% 2.40% 2.06% 1.02 1.11% 1.07%
Adverse opinion 0.06
Proportion of MAOs 13.44% 8.36% 10.94% 12.44% 10.29% 7.95 6.95% 6.65%
Proportion of clean opinions 86.56% 91.64% 89.06% 87.56% 89.71% 92.05 93.05% 93.35%
Reform of accounting standards and audit 
fees: Theoretical analysis
As both direct users and assurers of the account-
ing information of firms, auditors need to assess the 
relevant audit risk based on the quality of the ac-
counting information provided by firms. Accounting 
information risk (accounting information quality) is 
an important factor affecting audit risk. For exam-
ple, when accrual items are higher (accounting in-
formation quality is lower), auditors are more likely 
to issue MAOs (Bartov et al., 2000), the probability 
of audit failure is greater (Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2002) and firms are more likely to change auditors 
to obtain a clean opinion (DeFond and Subraman-
yam, 1998). These previous empirical results indi-
cate that changing accounting information quality 
will influence audit risk. There are some similar em-
pirical findings in China on this topic. For example, 
a return on equity (ROE) in the range of “Baopai” 
[In China, if losses have been incurred for 3 years in 
succession in any listed firm, then the stock of the 
listed firm is likely to be delisted. To avoid the oc-
currence of this situation, the listed firms will make 
use of various measures to be profitable and the be-
havior of these firms is called “Baopai”. The range 
of “Baopai” refers to ROE that falls in the range of 
0–2%] is an important factor that significantly af-
fects annual audit fees (Lina, 2003).
The ratio of the amount guaranteed by other 
firms to total assets and the ratio of accounts receiv-
able to total assets also significantly affect audit fees 
Social science section
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(Jixun et al., 2005). When listed firms change audi-
tors, the new auditors are prone to use the degree of 
earnings management of the firm to measure audit 
risk and require higher fees as a result (Yanheng and 
Dequan, 2005). Audit fees are also positively related 
to the difference between book income and taxable 
income (Qian and Zhou, 2005). These research re-
sults from China suggest that the lower the account-
ing information quality of a firm, the higher the risk 
that auditors must bear and the higher the audit fees 
that they require as compensation for the elevated 
risk. Although the CAS changed, the ability of firms 
to generate cash flow did not change and the impact 
of the change in the CAS on audit pricing can thus 
be explained as the impact of the change of CAS on 
auditors’ expected audit risk.
As stated, an important characteristic of the new 
CAS is that it uses fair value as an additional basic 
measurement attribute. When we examine the spe-
cific content of the new accounting standards, such 
as the standards on inventory, the restructuring of 
debt, consolidated financial statements, financial 
instruments and income taxes, we note that there 
are many changes. In general, the new accounting 
standards are greatly different in content and the ap-
plication of the standards has become more compli-
cated. Thus, the ability and professional judgment 
required of accountants is greater.
Under the old accounting standards, auditors 
formed stable expectations of the quality of ac-
counting information and the related audit risk of 
the firms that they audited. Under the new account-
ing standards, auditors need to fully assess the au-
dit risk of firms, especially the change in detection 
risk. The main factors of audit risk – inherent risk 
and internal control risk – did not change with the 
change in accounting standards. However, due to 
the introduction of the fair value measurement, au-
ditors must reevaluate the fairness of the disclosed 
accounting information. The consequence for the 
whole audit market is an increase in detection risk 
and thus the overall audit risk, which has caused an 
increase in audit fees.
To control for the impact of the change in ac-
counting standards on the comparability of finan-
cial information, listed firms in China had to disclo-
sure how their net income under the old standards 
changed under the new standards. Thus, there are 
two numbers for net income in 2006. Kai et al. 
(2009) argue that the adoption of the new CAS will 
increase the expected uncertainty of investors about 
accounting information quality.
Under the old standards, investors could form 
relatively stable expectations about accounting in-
formation quality. In the transition to the new ac-
counting standards, however, these expectations 
disappeared and new expectations had yet to be ef-
fectively formed, which increased investors’ expect-
ed uncertainty about firms’ accounting information 
quality and increased the cost of capital of firms 
and reduced their value. The change in the CAS 
may also have affected auditors’ assessment of the 
risk of firms. There are two specific aspects of firm 
risk: market risk and information disclosure risk. 
According to the old accounting rules, which were 
based on historical costs, firms were not required to 
disclose their market risk. However, when the new 
accounting standards were implemented for the first 
time, the difference between the net income accord-
ing to the old and new accounting standards reflect-
ed the market risk faced by firms to a certain degree. 
Market risk here refers to the potential impact of the 
change in the market price of assets on the continu-
ing operations of firms. Even if investors can obtain 
information about firms’ market risk through other 
channels, the duty of auditors is to provide assur-
ances about the accounting information disclosed in 
financial reports. Once the information relevant to 
the risk is disclosed in the financial report, auditors 
must adjust their own risk expectations.
When the influence of the change in accounting 
standards on the new income information is greater, 
the continued viability of the firms is more risky and 
the expected audit risk is higher. To compensate for 
the elevated expected audit risk caused by the in-
crease in market risk, auditors must demand higher 
audit fees.
This leads to our main hypothesis. H1. The greater 
the impact of the change in CAS on firms’ accounting 
information, the greater the increase in audit fees.
Research design
Sample selection
We select 802 non-financial listed firms that dis-
closed in their financial reports the relevant adjustment 
data about net income according to the rules for the 
fiscal year 2007 as our research sample. We exclude the 
following firms: (1) financial firms; (2) firms for which 
the relevant data cannot be found (including observa-
tions for which the audit fee or the value of equity is 
missing); and (3) firms with MAOs (including clean 
opinions with an emphasis of matter, modified opin-
ions, opinions with disclaimers and adverse opinions(.
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To test the main hypothesis, we construct the 
following model. Based on the research of Kai 
et al. (2009), we use the absolute value of the 
difference between the old and new accounting 
standards (the degree of adjustment between the 
two standards) as the proxy for the impact of the 
change in accounting standards on earnings in-
formation, and test how this value is related to the 
change in audit fees. The specification of the vari-
ables is shown in Table 2.
The main explanatory variable ABS_ChgCAS is 
a proxy for the degree of adjustment between the old 
and new accounting standards. According to the the-
oretical analysis, the greater the impact of the adop-
tion of the new CAS on the earnings information of 
firms, the higher the market risk embedded in earn-
ings information and the higher the audit fees paid. 
Thus, the coefficient b1 of the main explanatory vari-
able ABS_ChgCAS should be significantly positive.
The increase in audit fees may also be caused by an 
increase in auditors’ expenditure on learning the new 
rules and carrying out their business. The new CAS 
based on fair value are significantly different from the 
old CAS. As a result, auditors have had to study the new 
rules to use the new standards effectively. When auditors 
spend more time on or devote more energy to auditing, 
they charge higher audit fees in compensation. We thus 
add Chgd to the model as a control variable.
According to the research of Simunic (1980), 
Wang (2002) and Bing et al. (2003), the main factors 
that affect audit fees include firm size, the complex-
ity of the audit, the audit risk of the firm, the charac-
teristics of the audit firm and other characteristics of 
the audited firm. Much research indicates that firm 
size is the main determinant of audit fees, and total 
assets are usually considered to control for the influ-
ence of size. Here, we use the natural logarithm of 
the total assets of the firm (Size) to proxy for the size 
of the firm. We use the ratio of the sum of accounts 
receivable and inventory to total assets (Rein) to 
proxy for the complexity of auditing the firm. Re-
turn on equity (Roe), current ratio (cur) and a loss 
dummy variable opinions (MAOs) when they audit 
the financial statements of listed firms. (Loss) to 
measure the audit risk caused by firm characteris-
tics.
Table 2. Variable definitions
Type of  
variable
Defini-
tion Name of variable
Explained  
variable agree
The change in audit fees, calculated as (audit fees in 2007 - audit fm in 2006V(total assess 
at the end of 2006 according to die new accounting standards(1000)
Main  
explanatory, 
variable
ABS—
Chg-
CAS
The absolute, calm of the difference between net income in 21006 according to the mw 
accounting standards and that according to the old accounting standards/total assets at die 
end of 2006 according to the m % v accounting standards
Control  
variables Days
Days spent auditing, calculated as the number of days between the day when the finan-
cial report was announced to the public and the last day of the final year
Chgd
The change in the number of days spent auditing. calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
days spent auditing the financial report for 2007 minus the natural logarithm of the days 
spent auditing the financial report for 2006
Roe Return on equity (Roe)• calculated as operational income dividend by equity
Croc The change in Roe, calculated as the R» of the current year minus die Roe of tic previous year
Rein Proportion of accounts receivable and inventory to total assets
Crein The lunge in Reim calculated as the Rein of the current year minus the Rein of the previous year
Cur Liquidity ratio, calculated as the ratio, of liquid assets to liquid debts
Ccur The change in Cur, calculated as the Cur of the current year net of the Cur of the prev year 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
Rigour A dummy variable that takes the value of i if the audit firm is in the Big Four, and 0 otherwise
Lbigfour A dummy variable that is die lagged value of Big four
Loss A dummy variable that takes the value of I if die rat income in die current year is negative. and 0 otherwise
Uoz A dummy variable that is the lagged value of Loss
Audchig A dummy variable that takes the value of Iir die audit firm changed in that year. and 0 otherwise
Laudchg A dummy variable chat is the lagged value of Audch?.
For A dummy variable that takes the value of I if die turn has 0 shares or 11 sham and 0 otherwise
Sic Industry dummy variables The manufacturing sector is differentiated by the first two codes and the other sectors by the first code
Social science section
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We use another dummy variable (Bigfour), 
which is equal to 1 if the audit firm is in the Big Four, 
to measure the main characteristic of the audit firm. 
Whether or not listed firms change auditors may 
be correlated with instances where firms and audi-
tors do not agree on the amount of audit fees pay-
able. Thus we use a dummy variable to control for 
this situation. Because the dependent variable is the 
change in audit fees, we use the change in the con-
tinuous variables Roe, Rein and Cur (Croe, Crein, 
and Ccur) as control variables and add the lagged 
variables (Lbigfour, Lloss, and Laudchg) of the indi-
cator variables Bigfour, Loss and Augchg as control 
variables. As the purpose of establishing the new ac-
counting standards was to align with international 
conventions, the new CAS often refer to IFRS. As 
listed firms that have issued B shares or H shares are 
more familiar with IFRS than those that have not is-
sued such shares, the costs of implementing the new 
standards are different for these two types of firms. 
Thus we add another dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the listed firm has B shares or H shares (For) 
to control for this difference.
Finally, to remove the influence of potential out-
liers, we winsorize the top and bottom one percent 
of the distributions of all of the continuous variables.
Empirical results and analysis
Descriptive analysis
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that the 
average change in audit fees in 2007 is 0.0186. The 
average audit fee in one thousand-yuan total assets 
caused by the reform of the CAS is about 0.02 yuan.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max
Chgfee 802 0.0186 0.0989 0.4249 0.4494
ABS_ChgCAS 802 0.0084 0.0111 0 0.0545
Days 802 86.9726 24.2883 22 121
Lnd 802 4.4148 0.3451 3.0910 4.7958
Chgd 802 0.0111 0.4085 1.3531 2.1102
Croe 802 0.0238 0.1554 1.2384 0.7566
Crein 802 0.0360 0.0803 0.2768 0.2598
Ccur 802 0.0301 0.6804 3.4115 2.2920
Size 802 21.6216 1.0519 18.0281 25.6966
Bigfour 802 0.0623 0.2419 0 1
Lbigfour 802 0.0648 0.2464 0 1
Loss 802 0.0599 0.2374 0 1
Lloss 802 0.0736 0.2612 0 1
Audchg 802 0.0848 0.2787 0 1
Laudchg 802 0.0736 0.2612 0 1
For 802 0.0137 0.1164 0 1
The difference between net income according to 
the old and new CAS (ABS_ChgCAS) is 0.008 on 
average, which suggests that the difference in net in-
come in one-thousand-yuan total assets is 0.8 yuan.
Days is the time between the end of the fiscal year 
and the announcement date of the financial report, 
and lnd is the natural logarithm of Days. Among the 
802 firms, the shortest period is 22 days, the longest 
period is 121 days and the average period is 86.9726 
days. Chgd is the difference between lnd in the cur-
rent year and lnd in the previous year. The average 
Chgd is _0.01, which suggests that the time spent on 
auditing financial reports in 2007 is only slightly less 
than the time spent in 2006, which implies that the 
change in the CAS has not significantly increased 
the time that audit firms spend auditing.
Regression analysis
To control for the potential influence caused by 
sample selection bias, we first use our sample to test 
the model of Simunic (1980) and Gul (1999). If the 
result is generally consistent with the results in these 
past studies, then we can conclude that our findings are 
not caused by the uniqueness of the selected sample. 
The descriptive statistics for the industry structure of 
the audit market suggest that audit fees increased sig-
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nificantly after the change in the CAS. The question 
then arises as to whether this increase in audit fees is 
due to changes in the characteristics of firms or to the 
changes in the CAS. The foregoing analysis does not 
give direct evidence on this, which is the question that 
the hypothesis testing is attempting to answer.
Table 4 shows the results of a regression using 
our sample of the main variables from the model of 
Simunic (1980) and Gul (1999) to test for the influ-
ence of sample selection bias in our research sample 
and to test whether audit fees increased significantly 
following the change in the CAS.
The first regression in Table 4 presents the re-
sults for the sample of all listed firms for the period 
2004–2008.
The second regression presents the results for 
the sample excluding the observations from 2006, as 
we consider 2006 to be the transitional period dur-
ing which the CAS changed. The sample in the third 
regression includes only observations of listed firms 
that existed in all years between 2004 and 2008 (bal-
anced panel data). The regression results are gener-
ally consistent those reported by Simunic (1980) and 
Gul (1999). Specifically, the coefficient of Cur is sig-
nificantly negative, which suggests that the higher the 
liquidity of a firm, the lower its financial risk, the low-
er the audit risk and the lower the audit fee charged by 
auditors to audit the firm. The coefficient of Bigfour 
is significantly positive, which means that the audit 
fees paid to the largest four audit firms are signifi-
cantly greater than those paid to other audit firms. 
The coefficients of Rein and Loss are positive as pre-
dicted, but the results are not statistically significant. 
All of the results based on our sample are generally 
consistent with previous results, indicating that there 
is no selection bias in our sample.
Table 4. Regression result for the traditional audit pricing model
Explanatory variable Predicted sign (I) Coefficient (r-value) (2) Coefficient (r-value) (3) Coefficient (r-value)
Intercept ? 4.2041 4.1840 3.9985
(44,90) (40.25) (35.58)
After + 0.0237’ 0.0278... 0.0244’
(4.236) (4.569) (1,637)
Roe 0.0586» 0.098s*** 0.0839-
(1467) (4.306) (3.552)
Rein + 0.0278 0.0201 0.0081
(1.376) (O.Sas) (0.356)
Cur -0.0091- -0.0128- -0.0098-
(-3.536) (-5.047) (-4.055)
Size ? -0.1826- -0.1817- -0.1738*»
(-4248) (-38.04) (-33.62)
Bigfour + 0.2509»’ 0.22186»’ 0.25221»’
(15.47) (13.74) (12.19)
Loss + 0.0070 O.OIS4 0.0185
(0.554) (1.348) (1.186)
Audchg -0.0074 -0.0048 -0.0018
(-0.681) (-0.376) (-0.127)
For 0.0638» 0.0509» 0.0557’
(2.225) (2.432) (1.768)
N 4421 3505 2550
Industry control control control
R-squared 0.506 0.509 0.513
In the regression results for the three samples, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable After is signif-
icantly positive and the magnitude of the coefficient 
ranges from 2% to 3%, which suggests that audit fees 
increased significantly after the implementation of 
the new CAS in 2007 and 2008. 
In other words, the implementation of the new CAS 
led the audit fees for every thousand yuan in assets to in-
crease from 2% to 3%. The actual audit fees increased 
from 6,00,000yuan to 8,00,000 yuan after the adoption 
of the new CAS, an increase of almost one third (80/60-
1). Thus, the impact of the change in the CAS on audit 
market equilibrium pricing is not only statistically sig-
nificant, but also economically significant.
Table 5 presents the regression results for our main 
hypothesis test. The first regression considers ABS_
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ChgCAS to be the main independent variable and does 
not control for any other variables except for industry. 
The second regression controls for all of the other vari-
ables. Whether or not we control for other variables, the 
coefficient of ABS_ChgCAS is significantly positive at 
a significance level of greater than 5%. This result sup-
ports our main hypothesis that the larger the impact of 
the change in the CAS on firms’ accounting informa-
tion, the greater the change in audit fees. This result is 
economically significant. When the difference in net in-
come under the two standards increases by 1% in every 
thousand-yuan assets, the audit fee increases by 0.79%.
To measure the potential influence of time spent au-
diting on audit fees, we add the period between the end 
of the fiscal year and the announcement day of the yearly 
financial report Chgd as the proxy for auditing time.
The results in Table 5 shows that the coefficient 
of Chgd is negative but not significant. This result 
suggests that the actual time spent auditing does 
not significantly affect the audit pricing decisions of 
auditors. The coefficients of Bigfour and Lbigfour 
are not statistically significant, which confirm the 
conclusion reached from the descriptive statistics 
that the change in the CAS has not significantly in-
fluenced audit market concentration, and thus the 
concentration of the audit market does not have the 
ability to explain the change in audit pricing. All of 
the other control variables are generally not statis-
tically significant, except for Audchg, which is sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that the reason why 
firms replace their audit firm may be that they do 
not want to pay excessive audit fees.
Table 5. Regression results for the main model
Explanatory variable Predicted sign (1) Coefficient (t-value) (2) Coefficient (t-value)
Intercept ? 0.0024 0.1234
(0.0953) (1.404)
ABS_ChgCAS + 0.6496** 0.7907**
(2.042) (2.432)
Chgd + 0.0008
(0.0836)
Croe ? 0.0120
(0.425)
Crein ? 0.0480
(1.122)
Ccur ? 0.0010
(0.216)
Size ? 0.0055
(1.382)
Bigfour ? 0.0259
(0.350)
Lbigfour ? 0.0274
(0.372)
Loss ? 0.0019
(0.0867)
0.0240*
Lloss ? (1.931)
0.0296**
Audchg ? (2.237)
Laudchg ? 0.0134
(1.248)
For ? 0.0400
(0.896)
N 802 802
Industry Control Control
R-squared 0.0024 0.042
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Conclusions
This study investigates how the change in ac-
counting standards in China in 2007 has influenced 
audit equilibrium pricing. As auditors are the direct 
users of accounting information, the questions of 
whether and how the change in accounting stan-
dards has affected the industry structure and audit 
prices has become a common concern for academ-
ics and business practitioners alike.
We investigate the impact of the change in the 
CAS on audit pricing from three dimensions: the 
concentration of the audit market, the differentia-
tion of audit products and audit risk. The results sug-
gest that audit fees increased significantly after the 
adoption of the new CAS. However, the change in 
accounting standards did not increase the concentra-
tion of the audit market significantly, as larger audit 
firms have not displayed scale superiority or further 
increased their market share. The structure of audit 
opinions (the ratio of the number of MAOs to the 
total number of audit opinions) as the final product 
of audit services has also not changed significantly, 
and the specific reason why MAOs were issued in the 
sample period is not directly linked to the change in 
the CAS. We thus argue that the change in the CAS 
has affected audit pricing due to changes in audit risk.
We analyze the potential influence of the change 
in the CAS on audit pricing from the perspective of 
information disclosure risk. The change in accounting 
standards makes firms disclose more information that 
is relevant to market risk, which increases firms’ infor-
mation disclosure risk. As a consequence, auditors are 
confronted with higher audit risk and charge higher fees 
as compensation An important implication of our re-
search is that the increase in audit fees during changes 
in accounting standards should be considered as a po-
tential cost of the reform of the rules. However, although 
audit fees increase from the perspective of a single firm, 
the resource allocation efficiency of the audit market 
as a whole does not deteriorate. This is because the 
marginal return is always equal to the marginal cost in 
equilibrium, and it is the increase in audit risk caused 
by the change in the accounting standards that leads to 
an increase in the marginal cost of auditing that elevates 
audit fees. That is, the change of rules does not widen 
the gap between audit prices and the marginal cost of 
auditing, and does not lead to a deterioration of the re-
source allocation efficiency of the audit market. How-
ever, the increase in the expected risk of auditors caused 
by the difference between the old and new accounting 
standards causes auditors to pay more attention to audit 
risk relative to asset value and to charge higher audit fees 
as a result. This can be regarded to a certain extent as a 
signal to investors to pay more attention to the market 
risk of the operating activities of listed firms.
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